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FACING UP TO THE READING DILEMMA: A REVIEW AND 

CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF PYNCHON STUDIES 

Douglas Keesey 

The Fictional Lab~rinths of Thomas Pynchon. By David Seed. 
Iowa c~ty: 0 of Iowa , 1988. 268 pp. $25.00. 
The title of David Seed's recent book and the description 
on the jacket flap may lead readers to expect an Ariadne--or at 
least some guiding thread--to help them find their way out of 
the disturbing complexities of Pynchon's fiction: 
The possible meanings and allusions in Thomas 
Pynchon's work are almost infinite. His rich, 
polyvocal texts and his personal ability to remain 
virtually invisible pose a number of questions to 
readers and scholars alike: How do we read these 
encyclopedic fictions? What is the effect of all the 
tonal shifts? Where--if anywhere--is Pynchon's own 
voice, and how do we begin to interpret it? 
Despite these leading questions, the reader soon discovers that 
in Seed's view there is no exit from the labyrinths of Pynchon's
fiction: characters and readers alike are trapped. Stencil 
will never find his way out of the maze of V. -references, and 
neither will we: "This image of being trapped in a labyrinth
constantly 'chasing dead ends' could stand as a representation
of one possible reading of the novel" (109)--in fact , the only
reading Seed gives. In The Cryin~ of Lot 49, Pynchon "denies 
both Oedipa and the reader t e time to sort out the 
information. • • • The chronological sequence of events proves 
to explain nothing, partly because it includes a proportion of 
sheer chance and partly because the texture of the events is so 
complex. Pynchon indicates the complexity by using recurrent 
images of networks or labyrinths" (125-26). Finally, Seed 
describes "Pynchon's literary strategies" in Gravity ' s Rainbow 
as 11embed~ding] the reader in the text and deny[ing) him an 
over-view. 1 And this embedding and denial are emphatically
negative, entrapping, disempowering: "Pointsman, for instance, 
proves to be as much in a maze as his own rats and the maze 
supplies a metaphor of the novel's own labyrinthine structure" 
(205). 
It has been some time now since Pynchon criticism took such 
an unreservedly bleak view of Pynchon 1s fiction as Seed does 
here. Indeed, when Seed does mention other critics, it is often 
to disagree strongly with their affirmative readings. Seed 
argues that "One drawback in Slade ' s approach [to "Low-lands"]
is that he tends to moralize the story and to look for signs of 
affirmation which simpl~ do not exist" (33). Similarly, Seed 
argues about "Entropy that, "Plater and other critics 
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notwithstanding, the story affirms nothing" (52). Even critics 
who find some reason for hope in Pynchon1s uncertain structures, 
some definite possibility of optimism in Pynchon's indefinite 
labyrinths, are represented as taking a negative view. Through
highly selective quotation, Seed reverses molly Hite's emphasis 
on decentering as potential openness and plurality of structure, 
making it into a notion of total failure: "Hite has recently
explained the absent Centre as a crucial ordering device in all 
of Pynchon1s fiction, particularly Gravity's Rainbow, which 
demonstrates a 'plenitude of failed revelations"' (188). 
Perhaps most tellingly, Seed enlists Thomas Schaub against 
Edward mendelson in an argument against the "Rositive value" of 
the "religious and transcendental references in The Cryin1 of 
Lot 49: "In contrast Schaub has pointed out the impor ant 
element of doubt and uncertainty in Pynchon1s sacred terminology
which teasingly gestures towards another realm without 
categorically asserting its reality" (130). Here, unlike with 
Hite, Seed appears to capture perfectly Schaub's sense of the 
potentially positive nature of Pynchon1s ambiguity, but in 
Seed's view Schaub does not go far enough toward seeing 
labyrinth as trapt uncertainty as deflation, doubt as the demise 
of possibility: ' We could take Schaub's argunent a step further 
by suggesting that the religious allusions in Lot 49 are either 
parodic or paired with a profane meanin~ iJi"fCfi"" constantly
deflates the possibility of the spiritual" (130). But is this 
really the direction Schaub was going? Should the reader follow 
Seed in taking this last, decisive step? 
In exploring these questions, we will take a closer look at 
the history of Pynchon criticism. First, however , we should 
note the qualities and features which recommend Seed's book in 
spite of its tendency to reduce Pynchon's fictional labyrinths 
to inexorably closing traps. Seed, a lecturer in English at the 
University of Liverpool, has written numerous articles on 
Pynchon (some of which have appeared in Pynchon Notes) , and he 
is well versed in Pynchon criticism; his book shows none of the 
simple errors often made by those just getting their feet wet in 
Pynchon studies . Seed's prose is jaunty and unburdened byjargon, much like that of another British critic of Pynchon he 
often quotes admiringly, Tony Tanner. Indeed, Seed ' s discussion 
is rather like a series of free-wheeling lectures, moving
spiritedly through Pynchon's works in chronological order , 
pointing out what seems of most interest to him in any given 
place. What the book lacks in depth and in close-knit 
argumentation (Seed rarely pauses to tie his points together) , 
it partly regains in sharp local observations and intelligent
liveliness. 
Particularly good are Seed's comments on Pynchon's short 
stories and nonfiction. In an enlightenin~ turn of phrase, he 
describes Callisto and Aubade from "Entropy as "melodramatists 
of form" (40). About the use of second-person address in 
"Watts," Seed succinctly points out that "the 1 you' draws the 
reader imaginatively into the dramatic predicament of the 
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blacks. This is certainly the main polemical thrust of the 
article" (152). In another elegantly revealing formulation, 
Seed cO!Tillents on Pynchon 1s depiction in "Watts" of the whites as 
colonialists: "This is why he refers to the police as 'white 
forces 1 and the welfare offices as 1the outposts of the 
establishment. 1 Watts is an area under siege, 'a siege of 
persuasion' to conform to white images which is not entirely
metaphorical because it is supported by arms" (154). 
Althou~h it is rather hard to find justification for the 
book jacket s claim that "Seed reinterprets Pynchon 1 s texts from 
an original perspective" (neither the jacket nor the 
introduction makes any explicit mention of just what is original
about the book), still Seed does seem to pay special and 
important attention throughout to the theme of capitalism 1s 
turning characters into passive consumers, the media 1s 
colonization of the unconscious. Here is Seed's apt description
of Oedipa's attempt to resist COITITlodification: "Oedipa
demonstrates a humanizing impulse in her desire to see the life 
these images conceal and to probe behind the Fangoso Lagoons 
complex, for instance, to see how and why it was created. Her 
curiosity cuts across Inverarity's implied mercenary treatment 
of lots of land as mere coiTITlodity to be bought and sold" (148) . 
Finally, Seed ' s book has some added attractions that 
Pynchon readers may find interesting and useful. The last 
chapter, although it does not exactly place "Pynchon in Context" 
because very few connections with Pynchon are drawn, does give 
plot sl.JIMlaries and some critical discussion of the books for 
which Pynchon has written advertising blurbs over the past 
twenty-two years. An appendix prints the whole text of the 
letter Pynchon wrote to Thomas F. Hirsch in 1969 about Pynchon's 
research on the Hereros. The book also contains a good
reproduction of Bordando el Manto Terrestre by Remedios Varo. 
*** 
We have seen how Seed draws a sustained parallel between 
Pynchon's readers and his characters, between the labyrinths of 
and in Pynchon's fictions. Indeed, writers on Pynchon
frequently begin their essays by noting that most of Pynchon's
characters are themselves readers. What is less often observed 
is how many of Pynchon 1s critics succumb to the same reader 
tem§tation that besets his characters . There are, in fac~ 
kin s of reader temptation to which critics and characters 
regularly fall prey . The first and most obvious involves coming 
to a premature conclusion about the meaning of events, fixing on 
one of several possible interpretations, whether optimistic or 
despairing, as the definitive statement of the truth. The 
second temptation , more insidious, is to decide on ambi~uity, to 
determine that the meaning of Pynchon's fie 10n is 
indeterminable and that this undecidability implies a certain 
openness on Pynchon 1s part to the possibility of positive
change . The critics and characters in this second group fix on 
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uncertainty as a guarantee that more than one (the negative)
interpretation is still possible , that a saving plurality of 
options still exists. 
I would like to suggest that , as readers of Pynchon, we 
ought to try to resist the temptations that assail the readers 
in Pynchon, to move beyond repeati~ these characters ' too-easy
assumption that their readings, Whe er definite or definitively
indefinite, are necessarily warranted. Let us get past the 
critical repetition of characters 1 compulsions in order to 
examine what is behind their fears and desires (as well as ours) 
as readers, in order to understand what drives them to succumb1to reader temptation. As I read it, Pynchon ' s fiction is about 
this very subject of reader temptation: the self-defensiVe 
tendency on the part of readers in and out of fiction to reduce 
what I shall call the ambiguity of ambiguit~. While our first 
group of readers reduces an unsettling ambi guity to a single
definite interpretation, our second group reduces the ambiguity 
of ambiguity to a tositive ambiguity--that is, to a certain and 
ohtimistic ambigui y of open possibilities t hat defends against 
t e one possi bility that must be closed off: that there may
really be only one authorized interpretation of events and that 
this interpretation may be entirely negative . This second group 
of readers wants to believe in a Rositive ambiguity as 
reassurance from the author of the wor{l)d that these readers 
still have a (positive) choice among still possible meanings~ 
that the wor{l)d's end has not already been {negatively)
predetermined beyond their control . What both groups of readers 
consist ently refuse t o accept--and what , as I shall argue, 
Pynchon keeps raising before them {and us) as a possibility--i s 
this unthinkable ambiguity of ambiguity. Critics and characters 
alike can be observed defending against this radical 
undecidability, the possibility that meaning may be neither 
comfortably definite nor encouragingly ambiguous, but 
disturbingly unreadable--a meaning that thwarts the reader's 
desire for security of any kind , even the minimal assurance of 
positive uncertainty. 
The most obvious defense against the possibility of such 
ambiguity-to-the-second-degree is, of course, that adopted by 
our first group of readers: to reduce it all the way down to 
zero, to absolute certainty. Douglas Fowler is probably the 
most conspicuous among this group defending reader certainty.
As he argues , "One cannot oversimplify Pynchon 1 s only story: it 
is the oldest fairy tale of all . 112 In Fowler 1 s reading, the 
meaning of Pynchon ' s fiction is sr,atially and temporally
determinate . One can distinguish the 1 life"-affirming good side 
from the "mysterious" yet still identifiabl y "murderous" bad 
side, and one can know that the good side will be 
"unsuccessful": "Pynchon ' s real story always presents an 
isolated partisan of life unsuccessfully defending Our Kingdom
against a mysterious and murderous antagonist from somewhere 
else" (123) . The assertiveness of Fowler's diction ("One cannot 
~simplify , " "Pynchon's only story , " "Pynchon's real story 
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~") gives evidence of how strongly he feels the need to 
aefenO against even a hint of ambiguity. When Fowler insists 
that "we should not lose sight of the fact that [Pxnchon 's)
fiction is fantastic" (10/., the asseveration in "fact' and the 
underlining of "fantastic' seem to betraY some anxiety that we 
(or he himself?) may indeed "lose sight'1 of the "only" "real" 
interpretation of Pynchon's work. 
In reading Pynchon, Fowler seems to give in to the same 
temptation that besets the characters reading in Pynchon. In 
The Cryin{ of Lot 49, Oedipa tries to read the signs in order to 
discover he meamng of the "Tristero." Some of the signs seem 
to point toward the Tristero 1 s being an underground network 
offering hope to those barred from the official channels of 
communication, but other signs would indicate that the Tristero 
is either an evil organization murdering social outcasts or a 
figment of Oedipa's own paranoid imagination, a symptom of her 
mental illness. Throughout the novel, Oedipa is continually
tempted to fix on one of these interpretations as the truth 
about the Tristero, but even at the very end she resists giving
in to her fear of or desire for a conclusive reading, whether 
this be optimistic or despairing. Instead, she continues in 
expectation of further .i!Vidence: 110edipa settled back, to await 
the crying of lot 49."J 
But the critic succumbs where the character resists. 
Whereas Oedipa continues to hope that her negative
interpretation of events is only one of several possible
readings, Fowler says: 
we realize the poignance of her hoping to find herself 
Q!l!y "mentally ill, that that 1s all it was." • • • We 
KnOW that that is not all. There is very little real 
paranoia in Pynchon's fiction, for the paranoid sees 
design and danger in excess of the facts; Pynchon's
protagonists always begin by accusing themselves of 
paranoia but end up wishing their terrible 
recognitions were threly paranoia. The facts they
discover are worse an any fantasy. (16-17) 
"We should not lose sight of the fact that (Pynchon's] fiction 
is fantastic"; "the facts [ Pynchon""S"Protagonists) discover are 
worse than any fantasy": the "fact" that Fowler sees about 
Pynchon 1 s fiction is equivalent to the "facts" within the 
fiction that the characters could see if only they would give up
their fruitless hope for a saving uncertainty and recognize the 
"only" "real" reading of the wor(l)d: that the other is evil 
and that the self is doomed. 
Not surprisingly, Fowler is more approving of the 
characters in Pynchon whose reading of the "facts" within the 
novels seems to correspond more closely to Fowler's reading of 
this "fact" about the novels. When Fowler turns to another 
reader in Pynchon, Herbert Stencil in ~. the critic seems to 
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find in the character a congenial form of negative certainty.
Stencil is trying to read the "V. 11-signs in order to discover 
the truth about history: is the world entropically running 
down, or is there still some hope that history's course may yet
be open to positive change? Does V. represent the entropic
principle ruling the world or something else, something perhaps 
less dire and deterministic? Now Stencil may very well incline 
more toward a negative interpretation of events than does 
Oedipa, but even he refuses to accept any reading of the world 
as absolutely certain. V. may be read as a sign pointing
unequivocally to the world's inevitable disintegration, but 
Stencil resists this negatively certain interpretation
throughout the novel. Even at the end, Stencil avoids settling
for any one reading: he leaves ~alta just as the secret of V. 
seems about to be revealed (was V. the woman or force that 
killed his father, Sidney Stencil?). Herbert insists on 
retaining the "sense of animateness" his lively search for V. 
has brought him: "To sustain [this animatenessj he had to hunt 
V.; but if he should find her, where else would there be to go
but back into half-consciousness? He tried not to thinkt 
therefore, about any end to the search. Approach and avoid' 
(V 55). 
But Fowler reduces Stencil's complex attraction-repulsion
concerning the mystery of V. to a dead certainty: 
In [V.] Stencil fils is our guide to the history
beneatn history, ana he speculates (and we are of 
course to realize he 1 s correct) that our world has 
contracted a "disease" sometime between 1859 and 1919 
"which no one ever took the trouble to diagnose
because the symptoms were too subtle--blending in with 
the events of history, no different one by one but 
altogether--fatal." {123) 
Yet, in the context from which Fowler has excerpted this 
quotation, Stencil's words are indeed 11speculat[ion]. 11 It is 
Stencil p~re (Sidney, not Herbert) who is speaking, and his 
words begl.n with '"But then: suppose, 111 and form part of a 
dialogue in which several different interpretations of events 
are considered. "'Why say a disease?"' is one of the responses 
to Sidney's fearful imaginings (V 461 ) . But Fowler 11realize[s]11 
the Stencils1 worst fears as a matter 11of course"; the critic 
reads heri as fils, dialogue as monologue , speculation as truth. 
Why s ou d a----critic so readily a~ree to such a 11fatal11 
interpretation as the only "correct reading when even the 
characters themselves seem to try to avoid it? The temptation
here to which Fowler succumbs is that of negative certainty:
for some of Pynchon's critics and characters, believing they
know the worst seems to be at least a fraction better than total 
uncertainty about the meaning of events . (For an example of 
such a negatively certain character, recall Callisto in 
"Entropy, 11 who reads the signs of his environment as clearl~ 
pointing toward the entropic dissolution of the world: "[inj 
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his obsession [ ••• ] that constant 37 [degrees Fahrenheit] was 
now decisive" [SL 98].) 
Fowler is joined by other critics in this nihilistically 
certain reading group. In what follows, I have selected a 
representative sampling of dead-sure critical statements, and I 
have broadened the range of focus to include discussion of 
Gravity's Rainbow. Like Oedipa, Slothrop has difficulty 
dec1ding Whether his fears have a basis in fact or are merely
the symptoms of his own paranoia. Like Stencil, Slothrop is 
uncertain whether or not human sympathy can reverse the world's 
entropic decline or counter its movement toward a fiery
apocalypse. But the following critics~ certain--of disaster: 
[Gravity's ~ainbow] is not about the paranoid vision, 
but 1s one. 
Pynchon 1s law of human entropy orchestrates the life 
of the nation, the couple, the family, the individua~ 
into a symphony of death centuries in the unrolling. 
One can only wonder if in some odd way Pynchon has not 
taken the concept of entropy too seriously, allowing 
an idea from physics, which has validity as a 
psychological delusion, to dominate his own view of 
human life.ti 
(The rocket in Gravity's Rainbow] is falling in 
absolute silence, and we know that it will demolish 
the old theatre--the old theatre of what is left of 
our civilization.7 
In Gravity's Rainbow the possibility of boldly
confronting the world and one's fellow human beings
with true sympathy is totally corrupted by the 
prevalence of hierarchically structured human 
relationships and only when these patterns are 
momentarily subverted, more often by accident than 
otherwise, does sympathy emerge as a true alternative. 
It offers, ~owever, no way out of the apocalyptic
predicament. 
These critics may take different attitudes toward Pynchon1 s 
work, but all agree on what that work means: the drift in and 
of Pynchon 1s fiction is undeniably entrop1c. In each case the 
fearful uncertainty of Pynchon 1s characters is reduced to 
critical certainty that fear is warranted, that Pynchon has 
authorized his characters' fearful visions: "Pynchon1s law of 
human entropy"• "PDnchon has ••• taken the concept of entropy 
too seriously''; 11 Pynchon1s work] is not about the paranoid
vision, but is one." Symptomatically, criti'Cail<nowledge seems 
to be as absOlute as the object of knowledge is negative: "we 
know that it will demolish"; "the possibility ••• is totallt 
corrupted"; "no way out of the apocalyptic predicament." Wha 
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Josephine Hendin says of Pynchon is more probably true of 
herself and these other dead-sure critics: 
And in his myth of himself as death incarnate, Pynchon
transcends his limitations, puts himself beyond the 
pale of human pain and cruelty. He allies himself 
with the ultimate aggressor , the impersonal force of 
the entropy god. In the throes of his pessimism, by
force of his pessimism, Pynchon still pursues his own 
invul nerability. {50) 
It is Pynchon's critics who, taking the same epistemological
bait laid for his characters , have settled for a pessimistic
reading in order to convert a knowledge of powerlessness into a 
power of knowledge . 
But Pynchon ' s characters have far more difficulty than his 
critics in finding a dead-certain resting place. Although it 
might be some small consolation to know that one 1s "paranoid"
suspicions are in fact confirmed by solid evidence , that t he 
plot connections one fearfully infers are indeed a cruel network 
inescapably closing on the self, the ambiguous plot in and of 
Gravity ' s Rainbow, for example , does not ensure such awful 
certainty. As S!othrop is forced to realize : 
If there is something comforting--religious , if you
want--about paranoia , there is still also anti­
paranoia , where nothing is connected to anything, a 
condition not many of us can bear for long. Well 
right now Slothrop feels himself sliding onto the 
anti-paranoid part of his cycle , feels the whole city
around him going back roofless, vulnerable , uncentered 
as he is , and only pasteboard images now of the 
Listening Enemy left between him and the wet sky. 
Either They have put him here for a reason, or 
he's just here. He isn ' t sure that he wouldn't , 
actually , rather have that ~· ••• {GR 434) 
Slothrop might be surprised to read that certain critics have 
provided him with just such a {terrible) raison d 1etre, that 
they at least are sure that he lives only to be kl.Iled by a real 
enemy with a definite plot centered squarely on him. These 
positively despairing critics , in trying to give Slothrop the 
pathetic consolation of negative certainty, deny him what little 
hope he has of a saving ambiguity--the possibility that the 
network of plots is not yet determining, that he is not 
necessar ily the target ' s dead center . But Slothrop would still 
like to believe that the wor(l)d can "sust ai n many other pl ots 
besides t hose polarized upon himself [ ••• ] this network of all 
plots may yet carry him to freedom" (GR 603) . 
Which brings us to the critics who would like to see 
Slothrop ' s hopes of a saving ambiguity turned into a sure thing. 
There is one more kind of critic among our first group of 
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readers: unlike the deadly certain interpreters above, this 
type claims a ~ositive certitude. Here is one such critic 
disagreeing wit Fowler 1s negative reading of Pynchon 1s text 
while implicitly agreeing with Fowler's assumption that 
Pynchon's meaning can be determined: 
In seeing Pynchon's ghosts as entirely supernatural
and malignant, Fowler repeats the very mistake made by 
so many of Pynchon's characters: he fails to see the 
£hysical connection between the dead and the living,
he spirits' affirmation of the interdependence of all 
things in th~s world. 
This is my own statement from an essay in a previous Pynchon 
Notes,~ where I too succumb to the temptation of a desire for 
TIXe0 meanin~. The other critic's (and characters') failure 
becomes my 1 success" as I reverse Fowler 1 s authorization of 
characters' fears into a validation of hope: "These ghosts are 
not malignant, but only appear so"; 11Pynchon's ghosts represent
a warning to the hl.lllan race"; "there is yet time for those still 
living to learn to understand" (84, 84, 94). This battery of 
declarations shows me confidently penetrating beyond appearance 
to reality, explaining the reason for others' confusion of the 
two, and reassuring them that they still have time to learn what 
I know. 
Happily, I am not alone in this essentially unqualified
optimism; Edward Mendelson also falls into this group of 
positively determined readers. In his extremely influential 
discussion of The Crying of lot 49, Mendelson distinguishes
between the book's "ostensible subJect" and its secret subtext, 
but both are quite positive in import--especially the second: 
The ostensible subject •• • is one woman's discovery
of a system of communication, but the system refers to 
something far larger than itself: it fosters variety
and surprise, and offers a potential access to 
"transcendent meaning" and 11a reason that mattered to 
the world. n1 0 
One "discovery" "fosters" another revelation; a working "system 
of communication" among people in the secular warld increases 
the "potential" for communication with the "transcendent" 
beyond. By the end of Mendelson's essay, this "potential" has 
become a firm reality: 
This "promise of hierophany," of a manifestation of 
the sacred, is eventually fulfilled, and [Oedipa 1s]
"sense of concealed meaning" yields to her recognition
of patterns that had potentially been accessible to 
her all along, but which only now had revealed 
themselves. In the ?._rose sense, what Oedipa discovers 
is the Tri:stero, 1 a network by which X number of 
American[sj are truly communicating whilst reserving 
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their lies, recitations of routine, arid betrayals of 
spiritual poverty"--that is, everything profane--"for
the official government delivery system." {119) 
"Fulfilled, 11 ''revealed," "recogni[zes)," 11discovers11--but these 
positives are Mendelson's, not Oedipa s or Pynchon's. A look at 
the general context from which Mendelson has excerpted these 
particular quotations shows that Mendelson's knowledge is both 
more certain and certainly more joyful than Oedipa's: as she 
worries to herself, 
Either you have stumbled indeed[••• ] onto a network 
by which X number of Americans are truly
communicating[••• ]. Dr you are hallucinating it . Or 
a plot has been mounted against you[ ••• ]. Or you are 
fantasying some such plot, in which case you are a 
nut, Oedipa, out of your skull. (CL 170-71) 
As I did with Pynchon's ghosts, Mendelson seems to have reduced 
the disconcerting ambiguity of the signs surrounding Oedipa to 
a wonderful certainty. 
Interestingly, the more disturbing elements in this same 
passage from The Cr!ing of Lot 49 rise to the surface sixteen 
pages later in Mende son's essay like a return of the repressed, 
but the critic will admit them only in distorted form. 
Mendelson's compromise-formation retains his own optimistic
certainty about the meaning of the Trystero (it is positively
sacred) while conceding that Oedipa may still be unsure. What 
it seems she must do now is, as Mendelson has done , overcome her 
doubting-Thomas side and make a leap of faith: 
This is why the novel ends with Oedipa waiting, with 
the "true" nature of the Trystero never established: 
a manifestation of the sacred can only be believed in; 
it can never be proved beyond doubt. There will 
always be a mocking voice, internal or external, 
saying "they are filled with the new wine"--or, as 
Dedi a fears " ou are hallucinatin it • • • ou are 
an asyl.nq some r0 • 
e1.ther to afl.rm the existence of the 
Tristero--through which continuity survives, renews, 
reintegrates itself over vast expanses of space and 
time--or to be entirely separated, isolated, an "alien 
••• assumed full circle into some paranoia." {135­
36; my emphasis marks the return of the repressed. ) 
From Mendelson's perspective, Oedipa has a clear choice between 
positive and negative alternatives: "either" "affirm[ative]"
faith in a conmunity-saving Tristero "or" "mocking,"
11isolat(ing)" doubt. Mendelson's belief that he has a clear 
view of the problem and is in sight of the solution makes him a 
perfect example of the second kind of critic in our first group: 
the positively determined reader. 
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Th~2 Schaub's "Open Letter"11 and Pynchon: The Voice of 
Ambiguity are famous for qualifying Mendelson1s optimistic
certa1nty and maintaining the ambiguity of Pynchon's fiction. 
Schaub thus falls into our second group of readers: those who 
insist that one simply cannot get to any "stable meaning" in or 
of Pynchon's work. In his discussion of The Crying of Lot 49, 
Schaub argues that "Neither [Oedipa) nor the reader is allowed 
by Pynchon to ascertain the stable meaning of the blossoming 
pattern; without this certainty her usefulness in preservin~ 
order against a declining culture remains painfully ambiguous
(Ambiguity 30-31). Notice how certain Schaub is about Oedipa's {and our) lack of certainty, how definite he is about Pynchon's 
ambiguity: "Neither ••• is allowed by Pynchon to ascertain 
the stable meaning." 
But Oedipa is not so certain of her uncertainty; she is 
very much afraid that she rna~ already know the immutably stable 
meaning of the pattern and t at th1s mean1ng may in fact be the 
confirmation of her worst nightmares. As more and more of the 
people she loves disappear or die, Oedipa begins to fear that 
she does indeed detect a sinisterly stable pattern: "They are 
stripping from me, she said subvocally--feeling like a 
fluttering curtain in a very high window, moving up to then out 
over the abyss--they are stripping away, one by one, my men" 
(CL 152-53). Like Slothrop, Oedipa becomes afraid that, instead 
of facing a reassuringly ambiguous field of open possibilities,
she confronts a decidedly evil plot centered on herself: what 
if she is not free to choose, but already chosen as a victim? 
Because of her fear that her future is unambiguous, that the 
(terrible) truth will be revealed to her:-oedipa hesitates to 
follow her assumpt1ons about the meaning of the Tristero so that 
it. will not assume her: "Having begun to feel reluctant about 
Tcillowing up anyth1ng(, • • • Oedipa) left it alone, anxious 
that her revelation not expand beyond a certain point. Lest~ 
possibly, it grow larger than she and assume her to itself 1 (CL 166). Thus, while Schaub 1s assertion is an important 
counter to Mendelson's reduction of Pynchon's ambiguity, Schaub 
has himself reduced the ambiguity of ambiguity in Pynchon 1s 
work: the possibility readers 1n Pynchon face that there may be 
no ambiluity, that the very optiOn of opting among more than one 
possibi ity may already have been closed off. 
Schaub's positive insistence on ambiguity is what allows 
him to read ambiguity as something persistently positive. It is 
not long in his reading before the instability of meaning which 
he had earlier described as "painfully ambiguous" becomes much 
more optimistically undecidable: "with Oedipa we experience a 
broadening of consciousness, and a sense of the possibility for 
meanings which inhere in the world and in language. Those 
meanings, most skillfully in The Crying of Lot 49, depend for 
their vitality on the suspens10n 1n which they are caught"
(Ambiguity 41). The meanin~ in and of the book is more "vital" 
because of its "suspension, 1 more "broadening" because 1t cannot 
be closed off by any authorized interpretation. For Schaub, 
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Pynchon's ambiguity is a form of affirmation, indirect but 
necessarily so; it indiCates that one need not feel bound by any
existing structure of meaning, that one can always establish a 
new "relationship" with the wor(l)d and thus discover in it new 
meanings: 
For Pynchon to affirm directly that Oedipa's
experience is mystical or religious, or that Tristero 
exists literally, would be to change the entire nature 
of the book and reduce the importance of her 
adventures. Such an affirmation would mean only that 
she had found a secret enclave, instead of an exact 
and rigorous relationship between her culture and her 
understanding of it. (Ambiguity 107) 
In the end, Schaub seems as confirmed and affirmative about 
Pynchon's ambiguity as Mendelson is about Pynchon's determinably 
literal and religious meanings. Like Mendelson's, Schaub's 
reading can be read as a defense against Pynchon s radical 
ambiguity. In a compromise-formation even subtler than 
Mendelson's, Schaub lets a certain amount of ambiguity in only 
so as to feel he has mastered it all. Schaub is ready to 
renounce the certainty of "mere facts" and "answers" only if he 
can be certain that the consequent ambiguity is "order[ed]" in 
such a way that it is "luminous" and 11animating11 ~yriehon's 
stylistic balancing orders the ideas and visions of his fiction 
so that they remain • • • strict and lllllinous possibilities
rather than mere facts, animating clues instead of answers" 
(Ambiguity 4). 
It is probably fair to say that the majority of Pynchon
critics writing today may be placed with Schaub in this second 
group of positively ambiguous readers. Of course, as we have 
seen with Seed, there are also some neratively ambiguous
critics, decisive about the undecidability o Pynchon's fiction 
and equally certain that this unascertainability is a negative
thing: "We could take Schaub 1s argument a step further by
suggesting that the religious allusions in Lot 49 are either 
parodic or paired with a profane meanin~ iJ1ich constantly
deflates the ossibilit of the s iritual. But, as we have 
seen, c au s qua 1 1ca 1on o en e son s relatively positive
certainty was headed in the direction of a positive ambiguity, 
not, as Seed seems to believe, toward a negative ambiguity.
This last is Seed's own position, evidenced, for example, by the 
following: 
[In Gravity's Rainbow there is] a certain lexical set 
lltlich revelves around the concept of conditioning.
The main terms are; 'reflex', 'mosaic' ••• 'maze' 
••• and 'labyrinth', the latter three functioning as 
reflexive metaphors of the novel's own assembly.
Pointsman may be forgotten but reflexes never are. 
Slothrop after all comically reminds the reader of the 
sexual reflex. The notion of conditioning reinforces 
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the determinin~ nature of psycho-cultural patterns in 
the characters behavior. (177- 78} 
Once again we note that for Seed Pynchon 1s "labyrinths" are 
inescapable. Characters and readers alike are caught in a 
negatively "determining" "maze, 11 an imprisoning self-reflexivity
that is entirely determined by a disempowerin9 wor(l}d:
"Pynchon's vision of hunan action is bleak indeed" (168}. 
But most Pynchon critics today seem to favor Schaub1 s 
position over Seed's,13 reading Pynchon's fictional labyrinths 
as positively ambiguous, optimistically undecidable. The length
of the following list testifies to the popularity of the 
Schaubian position (Note that all of these statements are by
authors of entire books--not just essays--devoted to Pynchon} : 
Tristero both urges and denies interpretation, thereby
preserving its inward mystery and supplying the sense­
making structure necessary to connect the world with 
meaning•• • • the reader's active engagement with the 
text • • • becomes a creative act that transforms and 
renews. One's willingness to interpret while 
accepting the limitations of interpret1\ion [acts as]
a defense against creative exhaustion. 
[ Pynchon 1 s] main characters learn to live without 
planned futures, without livelihood, without stable 
identity•••• Even broken and imperfect patterns are 
capable of evoking the feelings that accompany our 
finding a sense of meaning. • •• [Reading) can help, 
us assimilate an experience of "meaningfulness, ' 
whether or not we ate able to express the latter in a 
coherent statement.lo 
[Pynchon's] own fictional worlds are 
pluralistic--governed not by a rigid, absolute, and 
universal Idea of Order but by multiple partial,
overlapping, and often conflicting ideas of 
order. • • • Precisely because the pres~acks
unity, it leaves room for unanticipated developments . 
As long as burgeoning meanings do not converge at a 
Holy Center, further meanings are possible. The 
absence of a definitive synthetic unity is finally a6condition for freedom.l 1 
The vev_ atmosphere of uncertainty so peculiar to 
Pynchon s work sugge~s that possibilities remain open 
even if unrealized.1 
Despite its frequent grimness, [Gravity's Rainbow] is 
not a novel of despair, but one of poss161lity•••• 
each critical view has tended to isolate one of the 
relative points of view in the novel as an objective 
conception of Pynchon's point of view, while actually 
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each point of view is really a part of an entire 
spectrun which is the "rainbow" of possibilities
encompassed by Pynchon ' s vision.18 
[About the end of Gravity's Rainbow:] Is it a third 
world war , a nuclear catastrophe? Or is it the 
leading edge of a radiant hour of enlightenment for 
mankind, of liberation from the cycle of entropy that 
we have been imprisoned in? 
The author does not t;1f us, for the future is 
yet to be shaped by us all. 
The critical consensus here seems oddly--and tellingly--in 
inverse proportion to the complexity and controversiality of 
Pynchon 's fiction. Each of the above readings argues that, for 
critics and characters, P~nchon's meaning is positively
ambiguous: its "mystery, 11 imperfect patterns," "absence of 
definitive unity, 11 "atmosphere of uncertainty , 11 111 rainbow ' of 
possibilities, 11 and wide-open questions all leave room for 
optimism--hope and free choice--on the reader' s part. 
It is true that Pynchon's novels, especially Gravitt's 
Rainbow, contain scenes of promising uncertainty and hopeul
doubt. Characters keep asking optimistic questions about 
whether or not impromptu action on their part might counter the 
plots formed to split them up : "Could it be there's something
about ad hoc arrangements [ •• • ] that must bring you in touch 
with the people you need to be with? that more formal adventures 
tend, by their nature, to separation, to loneliness?" (GR 620).
Always there is the hope that somewhere in the interstices of 
the plot ' s cruel structure it may still be possible to 
extemporize a bit of freedom, to evade determinism and find some 
"second chance" {GR 336) : "There is the moment , and its 
possibilities" {GR 159) . One of these key moments occurs when 
Slothrop, in the middle of his journey, has a vision of positive
ambiguity, a " feeling" that he may yet escape the cause-and­
effect of predetermined plot and reroute the course originally
laid out for him: 
Just for the knife-edge, here in the Rue Rossini , 
there comes to Slothrop the best feeling dusk in a 
foreign city can bring: just where the sky's light
balances the electric lamplight in the street, just
before the first star , some promise of events without 
cause, surprises , a direction at right angles to every
direction his life has been able to find up till now. 
(GR 253) 
These instances of promising uncertainty are important and 
do deserve to be singled out , as they have been by the critics 
quoted above . The problem arises when such critics read this 
optimistic ambiguity as definitive, when they speak of "The 
absence of a definitive synthetic unity" as "finally a condition 
for freedom"; of "mystery" as enabling "a creahve act"; of 
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"uncertainty" as indicating "open if unrealized" 
"possibilities. " Such SLJTlm8.ry statements about Pynchon 1s 
meaning reduce his radical ambiguity to something positive; they 
leave out of account equally important scenes Where ambiguity
itself seems in doubt , where readers are forced to face the 
possibihty that ali possibility of hope may be gone: the 
terrible truth is in sight. 
To take What is perhaps the most compelling example , 
consider the last page of Gravity ' s Rainbow. Just as Slothropr,
mid-way through his journey stood at "dusk in a foreign city,' 
waiting for the "first star~ and hopin~ that his wish to escape
their plot would come true, so Gravity s Rainbow ends with what 
"may have been a human figure , dream1ng of an early evening in 
each great capital luminous enough to tell him he will never 
die, coming outside to wish on the first star . " But this 
positive ambiguity is then made disturbingly radical, achieving
for a moment a terrible clarity: "But it was not a star, it 
was falling, a bright angel of death" {GR 760). It is hard to 
find much optimism or uncertainty in this sentence. Could it be 
that the deepest uncertainty concerns whether readers have any 
hope left of evading destruction, any real possibility of acting 
to avert catastrophe? At the end of Gravity ' s Rainbow, a rocket 
bomb seems set on its predetermined course, JUst about to fall 
on characters and critics alike , on sky-readers all. Apositive
ambiguity--"Just for the knife-edge, [••• ] just before the 
first star, some promise of events without cause, surprises"--is
counterbalanced by a negative that seems not really ambiguous
enough: 
And it is just here, just at this dark and silent 
frame , that the pointed tiR of the Rocket, falling
nearly a mile per second, [••• ] reaches its last 
unmeasurable gap above the roof of this old theatre , 
the last delta-t. 
There is time, if you need the comfort, to touch 
the person next to you, or to reach between your own 
cold legs • • • (GR 760) 
Even the song that readers are then encouraged to sing ("Now 
everybody--"), though it seems to contain some ambiguous hope ("There is a Hand to turn [back?] the time, I Though thy [hour?] 
Glass today be run"), is nevertheless included in the list of 
all-too-certainly cold comforts like touchln~ a stranger or 
masturbating: "or, if song must find you, here s one" {GR 760}. 
Optimistically ambiguous readings , because they do not take 
into account the strong negative tendency of scenes like this, 
effectively prevent us from seeing important aspects of 
Pynchon ' s meaning. Such readings will not admit that Pynchon 
seems to see destruction from nuclear bombs--descendants of the 
V-2--as a near-inevitability. The description of the "Rocket" 
as "reach[ing] its last unmeasurable gap' above our world may
hold out some very small hope, but its tendency is certainly 
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downward. Furthermore, by suggesting that Pynchon sees escape
from the fearful plots of those in power as a definite 
possibility, these readings seriously underestimate Pynchon's 
concern about the strength of the military-industrial complex
and its near-deterministic control over future events. In his 
Introduction to Slow Learner, Pynchon writes: 
Except for that succession of the criminally insane 
who have enjoyed power since 1945, including the power 
to do something about it ["The Bomb"], most of the 
rest of us poor sheep have always been stuck with 
simple, standard fear. I think we all have tried to 
deal with this slow escalation of our helplessness and 
terror in the few ways open to us, from not thinking
about it to going crazy from it. (SL 18-19) 
This passage is remarkably unambiguous about the terrible 
strength of those in power and about a corresponding tendency on 
everyone else's part toward increasing 11hel~lessness and 
terror. 11 Similar1y, numerous passages in Pynchon s fiction join
the end of Gravity's Rainbow in suggesting a decidedly downward 
turn to the plot that characters and critics would rather not 
face: 
But it is a curve each of them feels, 
urvnistakably. It is the parabola [of the Rocket 1s 
flight and fall) • They must have guessed, once or 
twice--guessed and refused to believe--that 
everything, always, collectively, had been moving
toward that purified shape latent in the sky, that 
shape of no surprise, no second chances, no return. 
(GR 209) 
What I would like to suggest is that in reading Pynchon we 
should give due weight to this ambiguity of ambiguity--the ever­
present possibility that, whether readers want to admit it or 
not, uncertainty is not necessarily positive. Doubt may be 
merely a defense against fearful knowledge. The wor(l)d's
meaning, the (negative) tendency of its one correct 
interpretation, may already have been decided beyond the 
reader's control. Pynchon's characters read the signs of their 
world in order to gain the clear understanding necessary for 
effective action, but they are also reluctant for understanding 
to clarify in case it should reveal that no effective action is 
possible, that the world's destruction is a fore~one conclusion. 
One half of the reading dilemma facing Pynchon s characters is 
thus the problem of disambiguating the mysterious signs around 
them, gaining knowledge so as to claim some power; the other 
half involves the fear that knowledge, once attained, will prove
disempowering, a death sentence that cannot be suspended. 
The same year ( 1984) Pynchon wrote of the widening gap
between the power of the military-industrial complex and the 
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escalating helplessness and terror of everyone else, he also 
wrote that there 
seems to be a growing consensus that knowledge really
is power, that there is a pretty straightforward
conversion between money and information, and that 
somehow, if logistics can be worked out, miracles may 
yet be possible••• • [I]t may be that the deepest 
• • • here of miracle has now come to reside in the 
computer s ability to get the right data to those whom 
the data will do the most good. With the proper
deployment of budget and computer time, ~ will 
save ourselves from nuclear extinction. 
This statement--from the essay "Is It O.K. to Be a 
Luddite?11 --perfectly describes the hope shared by so many of 
Pynchon's characters that, if they could get to real knowledge,
they might have some effective power, maybe even enough to work 
a miracle, to avert the near-inevitability of nuclear 
destruction. In this essay Pynchon still speaks of the 
military-industrial complex as "completely" dominant over the 
rest of the population, but he seems to join in his characters' 
hope that knowledge and hence power may yet be attainable: 
The word "Luddite" [originally attributed to those who 
smashed machinery in the early days of the industrial 
revolution] continues to be applied with contempt to 
anyone with doubts about technology, especially the 
nuclear kind. Luddites today are no longer faced with 
human factory owners and vulnerable machines•••• 
[T ]here is now a permanent power establishment of 
admirals, generals and corporate C£0 1 s, up against
whom us average poor bastards are completely
outclassed• ••• We are all supposed to keep tranquil
and allow it to go on, even though, because of the 
data revolution it becomes ever da less oss~ble to 
Pynchon's novels are filled with characters who would like to 
believe that their only reading problem involves getting to the 
truth, resolving the ambiguities devised by the power
establishment to fool them, to keep them ignorant and impotent. 
But there is also that other side to the reading dilemma, 
the fear that resolution means dissolution, certainty certain 
destruction. It might be better not to know if knowledge must 
prove incapacitating, confirming the loss of power one had hoped 
to find. Perhaps the prime embodiment of all Pynchon's
characters' fears in this regard is Byron the Bulb, whose dream 
of informed action turns into a nightmare of confirmed futility.
Byron investigates the power establishment, disambiguating their 
signs until the true pattern begins to emerge, but this reading 
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only reveals the undeniable extent of their power, the 
unbeatable force he is up against: 
Byron [ • •• ] sees more and more of this pattern.[...r The pattern gathers in his soul [ •• • ], and 
the grander and clearer it grows, the more desperate
Byron gets. Someday he will know everything, and 
still be as impotent as before. His youthful dreams 
of organizing all the bulbs in the world seem 
impossible now--the Grid is wide open, all messages 
can be overheard, and there are more than enough 
traitors out on the line. (GR 654-55) 
It is the horror of ending up like Byron, "knowing the truth and 
powerless to change anything" (GR 655}, that traps the readers 
in Pynchon between fear and desire, between a need for knowledge 
to ensure power and a fear of knowledge confirming impotence. 
Like Byron, these readers want to see reading as a prelude to 
resistance: the right information must be gathered so that the 
rebellion can be organized, effective action against a known 
enemy. But reading may reveal that the enemy has already taken 
every position that matters, already co-opted enough of the 
potential resistance to make revolution impossible . This is the 
reading dilemma presented to readers in and of Pynchon's 
fiction. 
Facing up to this reading dilerrrna means not taking that 
"step further' toward the negatively ambiguous reading advocated 
by Seed, but it also means refusing to succumb to the hopeful
open-endedness of a positive ambiguity (Schaub's
interpretation). We cannot feel the full disturbance of the 
radically ambiguous reading dilemma confronted by Pynchon 1s 
characters if we as critics reduce that deep uncertainty to a 
negative--or a positive--ambiguity. Pynchon's fictional 
depiction of the reading dilemma we face in confronting the 
world is both more complex and more accurate than has often been 
realized. 
--Cal Poly 
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